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Unquestioned Testimony: How The Diminution of Live Testimony Threatens The 
Accused’s Right to Be Present During International Criminal Trials  
By Caleb H Wheeler, PhD 





 It is generally recognized that international criminal law provides the accused 
with a right to be present at trial. There are two components of that right which make it 
meaningful: first, as a right it can only be derogated from through an affirmative waiver 
made by the accused; and second, it requires more than the mere presence of the accused 
in the courtroom, it also demands that he or she be able to understand and participate in 
the proceedings. The second component of the right, that the accused be able to 
participate in proceedings, is increasingly threatened by evidentiary rules that restrict the 
accused’s ability to cross-examine the witnesses against them. This infringement creates 
a real danger that evidence that has not been properly tested will serve as the basis for 
guilty verdicts, thus increasing the likelihood of unsafe convictions. 
 
 This article aims to examine the phenomenon of evidentiary rules that impact the 
accused’s right to be present. It will do this in two substantive parts. First, it will 
demonstrate that the accused has a right to be present at trial in international law, define 
that right, contextualize the right in terms of the larger right to a fair trial and discuss how 
the accused, at least in evidentiary matters, has a greater interest in fairness than the 
prosecution. Second, the article will examine three different evidentiary practices used at 
international criminal justice institutions that have the tendency to limit the accused’s 
ability to participate in trial and, in turn his or her right to be present. This article 
concludes that some, but not all, of these practices do represent a meaningful limitation 
on the accused’s right to be present and should be used sparingly so as to avoid causing 
any harm to the accused’s fair trial rights. 
 1 
1.  Introduction  
  
 The accused’s right to be present at trial is one of the defining components of the 
right to a fair trial. 1 The presence of the accused at trial is considered “an essential 
element of procedural equality” that gives meaning to the principle that “criminal 
defendants are legally entitled to be personally present at their own trials.” 2  The 
accused’s presence allows him or her to exercise a number of other rights including: 
assisting in his or her own defense; consulting, and in some cases selecting, his or her 
own counsel; confronting the witnesses or the evidence presented against him or her; and 
testifying on his or her own behalf at trial.3   
 Increasingly, evidentiary rules have been introduced at the international and 
internationalized criminal courts and tribunals that have the tendency to threaten the 
accused’s right to be present during trial. Presence at trial must be understood as 
involving more than just the physical presence of the accused; it must also extend to their 
ability to understand participate in trial. 4  A fundamental part of the accused’s 
participation is his or her ability to challenge the evidence introduced against them, which 
                                                        
1 Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 175 
(Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2003); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context 
of Criminal Justice: Identifying International Procedural Protections and Equivalent 
Protections in National Constitutions, 3 Duke J. Comp. & Inter. L. 235, 267 (1993). 
2 Richard May and Marieke Wierda, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 280 
(Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2002); see also Neil Cohen, Trial in Absentia Re-
Examined, 40(2) Tenn. L.R. 155, 156 (1973). 
3 Daryl A. Mundis, Current Developments: Improving the Operation and Functioning of 
the International Criminal Tribunals, 94 A.J.I.L. 759, 761 (2000). 
4 Sarah J. Summers, FAIR TRIALS: THE EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
TRADITION AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 113 (Hart 
Publishing 2007); Catherine S. Namakula, Language Rights in the Minimum Guarantees 
of Fair Criminal Trial, 19(1) J. Speech, Language & L. 73, 84 (2012). 
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is most effectively done through cross-examination. 5  Evidentiary rules that limit the 
ability of the accused to fully question the witnesses testifying against them may violate 
the accused’s right to be present and create the danger that trial may result in unfair 
convictions. 
 This article will focus on evidentiary restrictions placed on the accused’s right to 
be present at trial as reflected through limitations on his or her ability to participate in the 
proceedings. It will demonstrate that restricting the accused’s ability to cross-examine the 
witnesses against them constitutes an infringement on the right to be present at trial. It 
will do this in two substantive parts. First, it will show that the accused has a right to be 
present at trial in international criminal law, define that right and explore the 
interconnection between the right to be present and the ability to properly examine the 
witnesses called to testify during trial. Second, it will look at three different ways in 
which witness examinations have been limited by international criminal justice 
institutions. The three types of limitations discussed are anonymous witness testimony; 
the use of written witness statements in lieu of live, in-person witness testimony; and the 
introduction of hearsay evidence. This article will conclude that the limitations placed on 
the accused’s ability to examine the witnesses against him or her impinge upon the right 
to be present at trial. 
2. The Right To Be Present At Trial In International Criminal Law 
 2.1 The Position of the Right to be Present in International Criminal Law 
 Numerous human rights instruments and all of the modern international criminal 
statutes either explicitly refer to the accused’s right to be present or describe the presence 
                                                        
5 Adrian A.S. Zuckerman, THE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 93-4 
(Clarendon Press, 1989). 
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of the accused at trial as one of the minimum guarantees of a fair trial. The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the first international instrument to address the 
accused’s presence at trial as a right, sets out a wide-ranging rights regime impacting 
numerous areas of life including the right to a fair trial. The right to be present at trial can 
be found in Article 14(3)(d), which specifically asserts that “[i]n the determination of any 
criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum 
guarantees, in full equality:…(d) [t]o be tried in his presence…” 6  Although Article 
14(3)(d) of the International Covenant does not explicitly call presence at trial a right, the 
Human Rights Committee later confirmed that it should be regarded as such. 7  This 
formulation of the accused’s right to be present has served as the basis of the accused’s 
right to be present in a variety of different contexts.  
 Many of the Statutes of international and internationalized criminal courts and 
tribunals modeled their own articles relating to the accused’s right to be present on the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and, in some instances, copied 
Article 14(3)(d) almost verbatim. The Statutes of both the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(collectively, “the ad hoc tribunals”) closely followed the example of the International 
                                                        
6 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 14(3)(d), opened for signature 
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
7 Mbenge v Zaire, Communication No. 16/1977, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2, Views, 
Human Rights Comm. ¶ 14.2 (Mar. 25, 1983); Maleki v Italy, Communication No. 
699/1996, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/66/D/699/1996, Views, Human Rights Comm. ¶ 9.3 (Jul. 
27, 1999); see also Human Rights Committee, General Comment 13, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/GC/13, ¶ 11 (Apr. 13, 1984). 
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.8  Article 21 of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and Article 20 of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda’s Statute are both titled “Rights of the Accused” and both explicitly 
state that the accused is “entitled” to be tried in his or her presence.9  The use of the word 
entitled suggests that presence of the accused is regarded as a right held by the accused 
and not a duty to be imposed on him or her. This interpretation is reinforced in a report 
issued in 1993 by former United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 
which he asserted that the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s 
Statute reflects the fact that trials in absentia are not consistent with the accused’s 
entitlement to be “tried in his presence” as expressed in Article 14 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.10 
 Article 17(4)(d) of the Special Court for Sierra Leone Statute mirrors the relevant 
Articles found in the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals.11  It indicates that the accused 
“shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:… 4. To be tried 
in his or her presence…”12 The Special Court ultimately found that Article 17(4)(d) was 
insufficient for its purposes and in 2003 it amended its Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
to specifically identify those situations in which trials may be conducted in the absence of 
the accused. Rule 60 authorizes the Special Court to conduct trials in absentia in two 
situations, both arising after the accused has made his or her initial appearance before the 
                                                        
8 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, art. 21(d)(4) 
(May 25, 1993); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 20(d)(4) 
(Nov. 8, 1994). 
9 Id. 
10  Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council 
Resolution 808’, ¶ 101, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993). 
11 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 17(4)(d) (Jan. 16, 2002). 
12 Id. 
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court. The first arises when the accused has been afforded the right to appear but refuses 
to do so.13 The second occurs when the accused “is at large and refuses to appear in 
court.”14 In both instances, the matter can proceed if the Judge or Trial Chamber “is 
satisfied that the accused has, expressly or impliedly, waived his right to be present.”15  A 
right, by its very nature, is something held by the right holder, which only he or she can 
waive.16 By limiting trial in absentia to situations in which the accused has appeared 
before the court, and following a finding of an express or implied waiver on the part of 
the accused, the Special Court for Sierra Leone tacitly endorsed the notion that presence 
at trial is a right.  
 Like the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
the Statute of the International Criminal Court also defines the accused’s presence at trial 
as a right. Article 63(1) of the Rome Statute unequivocally states that “[t]he accused shall 
be present during the trial.”17 This statement, taken alone, does not conclusively show 
that the accused has a right or a duty to be present at trial because it allows for the 
possibility that the accused’s presence can be required rather than resulting from the 
exercise of a right. However, if the Statute is read as a whole, it becomes evident that the 
accused has a right to be present at trial. That is because Article 67, much like Article 21 
of the Yugoslavia Tribunal’s Statute and Article 20 of the Rwanda Tribunal’s Statute, 
sets out the “Rights of the Accused” and identifies presence at trial as one of the 
                                                        
13 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Special Court for Sierra Leone, r. 60(A)(i) (as 
amended Mar. 7, 2003). 
14 Id. r. 60(A)(ii). 
15 Id. r. 60(B). 
16 Martin Böse, Harmonizing Procedural Rights Indirectly: The Framework Decision on 
Trials in Absentia, 37 N.C. J. Int’l. L. & Comm. Reg. 489, 503 (2011). 
17 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 63(1) (Jul. 17, 1998). 
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entitlements contained therein.18 The Trial Chamber decisions in Prosecutor v. Ruto et al. 
and Prosecutor v. Kenyatta confirmed that Article 67(1)(d) establishes the accused’s right 
to be present at trial.19 The Ruto et al. Court found that “there is no doubt that presence at 
trial is a right for the accused” as expressed by Article 67(1)(d) of the Statute.20  In a 
similar vein, the Kenyatta Court also announced that “[i]t is recognised that the presence 
of the accused during the trial is ... a right” and that the “[p]resence of the accused is the 
default position.”21  
 The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia also has a strong 
preference in favor of conducting trial in the accused’s presence. Like Article 63 of the 
Rome Statute, Rule 81 of the Extraordinary Chambers’ Internal Rules stands for the 
general proposition that “the accused shall be tried in his or her presence”, limited only 
by the exceptions contained therein. 22  The approach taken by the Extraordinary 
Chambers appears rather neutral, however the enumerated exceptions to the rule suggest 
it is required that the accused be present. The Internal Rules do allow trial to proceed in 
the accused’s absence after he or she has made his or her initial appearance, in the 
following situations: when the accused refuses or fails to appear for hearings; is expelled 
from the proceedings for causing disruptions; or is too ill to attend.23 These scenarios, 
                                                        
18 Id. art. 67(1)(d). 
19 Prosecutor v Ruto et al., Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Public Decision on Mr Ruto's 
Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial, ¶ 35 (Jun. 13, 2013) [hereinafter 
Ruto Public Decision]; Prosecutor v Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Public 
Decision on Defence Request for Conditional Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial, 
¶ 124 (Oct. 18, 2013) [hereinafter Kenyatta Public Decision]. 
20 Ruto Trial Chamber Decision, supra note 19, at ¶ 35. 
21 Kenyatta Public Decision, supra note 19, at ¶ 124. 
22 Internal Rules, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, r. 81(1) (as 
amended Jan. 16, 2015). 
23 Id. r. 81(4)-(5). 
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with the possible exception of absence due to illness, meet the criteria of notice and 
waiver suggesting that although the Extraordinary Chambers generally require the 
accused to be present, his or her absence can be interpreted as an exercise of his or her 
right to be present. 
 Even the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s Statute, which famously contains a 
provision explicitly permitting trials in absentia, describes the accused as having a right 
to be present at trial. Article 16(4)(d) of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s Statute is 
modeled on Article 14(3)(d) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and Articles 21 and 20 of the ad hoc Tribunals. Similar to the relevant provisions in the 
Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals, Article 16 is titled “Rights of the Accused” and states 
that one of the minimum guarantees of a fair trial is that the accused “be tried in his or 
her presence.”24  However, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon makes the exercise of that 
right contingent on the terms of Article 22, the article that establishes the Special 
Tribunal’s trial in absentia regime. Although the right to be present at trial at the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon is circumscribed by its approval of trials in absentia, the Statute 
tries to create a system that respects both the accused’s right to be present while also 
allowing trial in the absence of the accused.  
 Regional human rights bodies have also codified the accused’s right to be present 
at trial. In 2007, the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights issued its 
“Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa”. 
Those Principles and Guidelines specifically indicate that a person accused of a crime has 
                                                        
24 Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, art. 16(4)(d) (May 30, 2007). 
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“the right to be tried in his or her presence.”25 The European Court of Human Rights and 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have also issued decisions on the accused’s 
right to be present at trial. Although the European Convention on Human Rights does not 
contain a specific reference to the right to be present at trial, the European Court of 
Human Rights has found that the accused’s right to be present is implicit in the object and 
purpose of Article 6(1) of the Convention.26 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
less explicitly endorses the right of the accused to be present, however it can be 
extrapolated from the decision in the Case of Valle Jaramillo et al. v. Colombia that it 
prefers for trial to take place in the presence of the accused.27    
 2.2 Defining the Right to be Present in International Criminal Law 
 It is clear from the relevant law that a right to be present at trial exists in 
international criminal law and international human rights law. What is less apparent is 
what exactly that right entails. Put briefly, the right to be present is a qualified right that 
permits the accused to choose whether he or she wishes to attend trial and carries with it 
an attendant duty preventing international and internationalized criminal courts and 
tribunals from excluding the accused without his or her consent. 28 The right may be 
voluntarily waived so long as the accused has notice of the proceedings sufficient to 
permit him or her to make an informed decision not to appear.29 The physical presence of 
                                                        
25 The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, ‘Principles And Guidelines 
On The Right To A Fair Trial And Legal Assistance In Africa’, Doc. No. 
DOC/OS(XXX), s. N(6)(c)(i)–(ii) (2003).  
26 Colozza v. Italy, 7 EHRR 516, ¶¶ 27-8 (Feb. 12, 1985).  
27 Case of Valle Jaramillo et al. v Colombia, Judgment, Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights Series C No. 192, ¶ 165 (Nov. 27, 2008).  
28 Caleb H. Wheeler, THE RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT TRIAL IN INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 7 (Brill, 2018). 
29 Id. 
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the accused is not, in and of itself sufficient to comply with the right; the accused must 
also be afforded the ability to understand and participate in the proceedings.30 Therefore, 
the right to be present is violated when trial is conducted in a manner that limits the 
accused’s ability to participate in proceedings and he or she has not affirmatively 
authorized that limitation. 
 It is particularly important that the accused is able to participate in those portions 
of the trial during which evidence is being presented and examined.31 It is through the 
presentation of evidence that the prosecution sets out the case against the accused and 
attempts to prove the charges to the appropriate evidentiary standard. Simultaneously, it 
is during this time that the accused is able to exercise his or right to confrontation and to 
rebut the evidence against him or her. When a trial court fails to fully protect the 
accused’s ability to examine the witnesses testifying against them it effectively limits his 
or her ability to participate in trial, which in turn constitutes a restriction on the right to be 
present.  
 The two important components of the right to be present to extrapolate from this 
definition are: 1) the accused, as the holder of the right, must affirmatively waive it 
before it can be derogated from; and 2) presence requires the understanding and 
participation of the accused and not just his her or her physical attendance during trial. To 
establish the effective waiver of any fair trial right, including the right to be present, three 
conditions must be met.32 Those conditions require that the waiver is: (1) unequivocal; 
                                                        
30 Summers, supra note 4, at 113. 
31 Id. 117; Fawzia Cassim, The Accused’s Right to be Present: A Key to Meaningful 
Participation in the Criminal Process, 38 Comp & Inter. L.J. S. Afr. 285, 285-6 (2005). 
32 Colozza v Italy, 7 EHRR 516, ¶ 28 (Feb. 12, 1985); Sibgatullin v Russia App No 
32165/02, ¶ 46 (ECtHR, Sep. 14, 2009); Sejdovic v Italy, 42 EHRR 17, ¶ 86 (Mar 1, 
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(2) does not run counter to any important public interest; and (3) is attended by minimum 
safeguards commensurate with its importance.33 It is apparent from the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights that the accused’s waiver of a fundamental right will 
largely only be effective when he or she has sufficient information to make an informed 
decision when making that waiver.34 Waivers can be separated into two broad categories; 
express waiver and implied or tacit waiver. Express waiver of the right to be present is 
not very controversial. Determining whether an accused has implicitly waived his or her 
right to be present at trial requires a difficult inquiry. The European Court of human 
Rights has found that in addition to the factors normally considered when establishing the 
effectiveness of a waiver, finding the existence of an implied waiver also requires a 
showing that the accused “could reasonably have foreseen what the consequences of his 
conduct would be.”35 
 The International Criminal Court implemented the most modern procedure under 
which an accused can waive his or her right to be present. Rule 134 ter of the 
International Criminal Court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence permits the accused to 
be absent for portions of the trial and Rule 134 quater could theoretically be used to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
2006); Demebukov v Bulgaria, 50 EHRR 41, ¶ 47 (Feb. 28, 2008); Poitrimol v France, 
18 EHRR 130, ¶ 31 (Nov. 23, 1993); Prosecutor v Ruto et al. Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, 
Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of Trial Chamber V(a) 
of 18 June 2013 entitled “Decision on Mr Ruto's Request for Excusal from Continuous 
Presence at Trial”, ¶ 51 (Oct. 25 2013); Nahimana,et al. v. The Prosecutor, Case No. 
ICTR-99-52-A, Judgement, ¶ 108 (Nov. 28, 2007). 
33 Id. 
34 Pfeifer and Plankl v Austria, Application No. 10802/84, Report of the Commission, 11 
October 1990, para 78; Zachar and Ćierny v Slovakia App Nos 29376/12 and 29384 
(ECtHR, 21 July 2015) para 74. 
35 Jones v United Kingdom App No 30900/02 (ECtHR, 9 September 2003); Talat Tunç v 
Turkey App No 32432/96 (ECtHR, 27 March 2007) para 59; Battisti v France App No 
28796/05 (ECtHR, 12 December 2006); Hermi v Italy (2008) 46 EHRR 46, 18 October 
2006 at para 74.  
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absent the accused from the whole trial so as to attend to “extraordinary public duties at 
the highest national level”.36  In both instances the accused is required to explicitly waive 
his or her right to be present and the relevant Trial Chamber is not permitted to find the 
existence of an implicit waiver.37 This practice clearly demonstrates that it is the accused 
who has control over his or her right to be present at trial. Within this construct, there is 
no room for the de facto implementation of limits on that right through the enactment of 
evidentiary rules. 
The second crucial point about the right to be present is that the physical presence 
of the accused is not sufficient, by itself, to meet the demands of his or her right to be 
present. Instead, an accused is only considered present when he or she is able to 
understand and participate in the proceedings. The Privy Council of the United Kingdom 
first explored this idea in Kunnath v. The State, when it found:  
It is an essential principle of the criminal law that a trial for an indictable offence 
should be conducted in the presence of the defendant. The basis of this principle 
is not simply that there should be corporeal presence but that the defendant, by 
reason of his presence, should be able to understand the proceedings and decide 
what witnesses he wishes to call, whether or not to give evidence and if so, upon 
what matters relevant to the case against him.38 
 
This approach to presence makes sense because the accused’s right to be present at trial 
would have no real meaning if it only required that the accused be physically present in 
the courtroom and nothing more.39 The accused’s physical presence must serve some 
purpose or it could be dispensed with without threatening the accused’s right to a fair 
trial. Therefore, an accused that is physically present in the courtroom, but denied the 
                                                        
36 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Criminal Court, r.134 ter(1) and r. 134 
quater(1) (as amended 2013). 
37 Id. 
38 Kunnath v. the State [1993] 1 W.L.R. 1315. 
39 Summers, supra note 4, at 113; Namakula, supra note 4, at 84. 
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right to fully participate in trial, is absent from trial as he or she is being prevented from 
engaging in the activities that give meaning to the right to be present. Participation is only 
thought to be effective when the accused understands the proceedings. 40  Effective 
participation has also been interpreted to include the requirement that the accused in a 
criminal trial “has a broad understanding of the nature of the trial process” and that he or 
she also understands what is at stake and the potential penalties that can be imposed if the 
accused is found guilty.41  
Support for the proposition that presence means more than just being physically 
present can also be found in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International 
Criminal Court and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Rule 135 bis of the International 
Criminal Court’s Rules permits the accused to submit a requesting asking that he or she 
“be allowed to be present through the use of video technology for part or parts of his or 
her trial.”42 The Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence takes a 
similar approach. Rule 104 indicates that an accused will not be considered absent from 
trial when he or she appears for trial via videoconference.43 Both of these rules recognize, 
either explicitly or implicitly, that although the accused may be physically absent from 
the courtroom, he or she is present to the extent that he or she can still follow and 
participate in the proceedings. By indicating that an accused is considered not absent 
                                                        
40 William A. Schabas, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 306 (4th ed, Cambridge University Press 2011); Cassim, supra note 
31, at 287.  
41 Grigoryevskikh supra note 4 at para 78; Güveç v Turkey App No 70337/01 (ECtHR, 20 
April 2009) para 124. 
42 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Criminal Court, supra note 36, at r. 134 
bis. 
43 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Special Tribunal for Lebanon, r. 104 (as corrected 3 
Apr. 3, 2014). 
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when attending via videoconference suggests that the accused’s mental involvement in 
the trial is more important than his or her physical presence. 
 The accused’s ability to confront the witnesses against them is made operative 
through the right to be present during trial and is considered a “universal feature of 
judicial fairness”.44 It is “linked to the presumption of innocence and the prosecution’s 
burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt” as it allows the defense to ‘explore 
the frailties of the testimony.’45 Confrontation often manifests itself in the form of cross-
examination, which is the most effective way for the accused to test the evidence against 
him or her. 46   Effective cross-examination “adds a dimension of credibility to the 
proceedings and enhances the ascertainment of the truth.”47 Preventing the accused from 
cross-examining the prosecution’s witnesses can constitute a flagrant violation of the 
accused’s due process rights including the right to be present.48   
 Despite the importance of the right to be present as reflected through the 
accused’s ability to confront the witnesses, it is also a derogable right that may be 
departed from through Constitutional, statutory and judicial practice.49 Limitations on the 
right to confront adverse witnesses at international and internationalized criminal courts 
and tribunals typically come in the form of positivist evidentiary rules or judicial 
                                                        
44 Stefano Maffei, THE RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE: ABSENT, 
ANONYMOUS AND VULNERABLE WITNESSES 9 (2nd Ed., Europa Law Publishing, 
2012) (Emphasis original). 
45 Eugene O’Sullivan and Deirdre Montgomery, The Erosion of the Right to 
Confrontation under the Cloak of Fairness at the ICTY, 8(2) J. Int’l. Crim. Just. 511, 513 
(2010). 
46 Zuckerman, supra note 5, at 93-4. 
47 Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 279; Geoffrey Nice and Philippe Vallières-Roland, 
Procedural Innovations in War Crimes Trials, 3(2) J. Int’l. Crim. Just. 354, 369 (2005). 
48 Gregory S. Gordon, Toward an International Criminal Procedure: Due Process 
Aspirations and Limitations, 45(3) Colum. J. Trans. L. 635, 682 (2007). 
49 Maffei, supra note 44, at 44-5.  
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decisions. These act to limit the accused’s right to be present even if the accused is 
physically present at trial. Restrictive evidentiary rules and judicial decisions manifest 
themselves in such a way so as to prevent the accused from fully and adequately 
confronting the witnesses against them, thus depriving their presence of effective 
meaning. So as not to render the right to be present meaningless, the effect of any 
limitation placed on the accused’s ability to confront the witnesses against them must be 
counter-balanced by restricting the persuasive weight of the evidence the accused is 
unable to fully examine. 50  Adequate counter-balances can include implementing 
additional procedural safeguards to ensure the fairness of the procedures employed or 
limiting the probity of evidence not subject to cross-examination.51  
International and internationalized criminal courts and tribunals have found that 
minor infringements on the ability of a party to question witnesses are not sufficient to 
constitute a violation of the right to be present. This was exemplified in Prosecutor v 
Blaškić, when Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia found that there should be “no excessive infringement on the rights of the 
Prosecution, inter alia the right to conduct an effective cross-examination”.52 This rule 
was later understood by Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen, who was a member of the Trial 
Chamber in the Blaškić case, as establishing the principle that any infringement on the 
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right to confront witnesses must be excessive to constitute a violation, regardless of 
which party is attempting to examine the witness in question.53  
This conclusion may represent too broad a reading of the ruling and raises the 
question of whether the prosecution and the defense both have the same right to a fair 
trial. The answer would appear to be yes, as demonstrated by the fact that all of the 
international and internationalized criminal courts and tribunals have jurisprudence 
extending fair trial rights to the prosecution. 54 Judicial pronouncements on this issue 
encompass a large temporal scope, with the earliest decision coming in 1995 in the Tadić 
Protective Measures Decision. There, the Trial Chamber found that a fair trial occurs 
when the prosecution, the defendant and the witnesses are all treated fairly during 
proceedings.55 This notion was reiterated as recently as January 2019, when Judge Olga 
Herrera Carbuccia asserted in her dissenting opinion in Prosecutor v Gbagbo et al. that 
“[t]he right to a fair trial applies both to the Defence and Prosecutor.”56 
While it may be appropriate to recognize that the right to a fair trial applies to 
both parties, it should not be understood as always applying equally. This is particularly 
true in relation to cross-examination because of the different outcomes that might result if 
the right to confrontation is not properly enforced. The defense cross-examines witnesses 
whose testimony is necessary to prove the guilt of the accused. In the absence of cross-
                                                        
53 Mohammed Shahabuddeen, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE AT THE 
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Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, ¶ 55 (Aug. 10, 1995) 
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56 Prosecutor v Gbagbo et al., Case No. ICC-02/11-01/15, Dissenting Opinion to the 
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examination, any weaknesses or deficiencies in the witness’s testimony will go 
unexplored and the evidence given will have the tendency of supporting the prosecution’s 
version of events.57 This, in turn, makes it more likely that the trial will result in an 
unwarranted conviction. The conviction of an innocent accused threatens the fair trial 
rights of all of the participants, including the victims. A fair trial is only achieved when 
the correct person is convicted as no trial participant can claim to have a legitimate 
interest in convicting an innocent accused.58 Therefore, it is paramount that the accused 
has the opportunity to effectively challenge the evidence against him or her as to do 
otherwise could do great violence to the fair trial rights of all of the parties. 
Conversely, the prosecution challenges evidence meant to create a reasonable 
doubt about the accused’s guilt. The inability to properly cross-examine the witnesses 
presented by the accused might lead to an unjustified acquittal. However, the prosecution 
has had the opportunity to present its entire case-in-chief prior to the testimony of any 
defense witnesses. It is unlikely that the prosecution had a very strong case in the first 
place if its trial strategy is dependent on the effective cross-examination of the defense 
witnesses. Further, even if one accepts that the right to a fair trial extends to the 
prosecution, infringements of that right must be rather significant before a violation will 
be found. This is evidenced by the approach taken in Prosecutor v Zigiranyirazo. There, 
the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda found that “[w]hile 
the Chamber must be diligent in ensuring that the Accused is not deprived of his rights, 
                                                        
57 Louise Arbour, The Crucial Years, 2 J. Int’l. Crim. Just. 396, 399 (2004). 
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the Prosecution must also not be unduly hampered in the presentation of its case.”59 This 
distinction about the extent of the duty owed by the trial court to the different trial 
participants is illuminating. The protection afforded to the accused in this decision is 
much greater than that owed to the prosecution. The duty owed to the accused is absolute; 
it requires the trial court to act diligently to ensure that he or she is not deprived of any 
fair trial rights. In contrast, the trial court’s responsibility in relation to the prosecution is 
much more qualified. First, not all of the prosecution’s rights need to be protected, only 
those pertaining to the presentation of evidence. Second, some encroachment on the 
prosecution’s ability to present its case is permissible, so long as it is not “unduly 
hampered” in its ability to do so. It should come as no surprise that the duty owed to the 
prosecution is limited in this way. The “unduly hampered” language of the Zigiranyirazo 
decision closely mirrors the “excessive infringement” described in the Blaškić decision. 
Both clearly envision a lesser protection for the prosecution than the more unconditional 
approach required to protect the rights of the accused. 
It is relatively uncontroversial to conclude that international criminal law affords 
the accused a right to be present at trial. That right has two substantive parts. First, as a 
right held by the accused, it should only be derogated from with his or her permission. 
Second, for the right to have any real meaning, it cannot be understood as only requiring 
the accused’s physical presence in the courtroom during trial, it also demands that the 
accused has the ability to understand and participate in proceedings. When international 
criminal justice institutions limit the accused’s ability to participate in the proceedings 
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they are, in effect, violating the accused’s right to be present. Evidentiary rules designed 
to expedite trial by allowing witness to testify in ways other than in-court viva voce 
testimony is a particular threat to the accused’s right to be present as they can deprive the 
accused of the ability to cross-examine the witnesses against them. This can inhibit the 
accused’s ability to fully challenge the evidence against him or her increasing the 
likelihood that trial may result in an unfair conviction.  
3. Evidentiary Restrictions on the Accused’s Ability to Participate in Trial 
There are three primary areas in which the international and internationalized 
criminal courts and tribunals have imposed some form of evidentiary restriction on the 
accused’s ability to question the witnesses against them. They are: (1) permitting 
anonymous witnesses to testify at trial; (2) the admission of written statements in lieu of 
oral testimony; and (3) the admission of hearsay evidence. The impact each of these 
limitations has on the accused’s ability to participate, and by extension his or her right to 
be present at trial, will be considered in turn.  
3.1 Witness Anonymity 
 The extent to which witnesses may be allowed to remain anonymous when 
testifying at international and internationalized criminal courts and tribunals is a highly 
contentious issue.60 Allowing witnesses to testify anonymously has been called “[t]he 
gravest form of interference with the right to cross-examine” because it prevents the 
accused from being able to adequately test the accuracy and veracity of the witness’s 
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testimony.61 It is thought that the accused’s ability to successfully challenge a witness’s 
testimony is severely limited when the witness is allowed to testify anonymously. 62 
When determining the modality of witness anonymity, trial courts are required to weigh 
two significant competing interests. On one hand, courts must consider whether 
maintaining the anonymity of the witness is necessary to protect against acts of witness 
intimidation.63 By contrast, they must also evaluate the extent to which preventing the 
accused from learning the identity of the witness will inhibit the accused’s ability to 
participate in trial and impact his or her right to be present.64 These conflicting demands 
indicate that a procedure must be established that will protect witnesses and their families 
from actual or threatened violence against their persons without also depriving the 
accused of his or her right to be present at trial. 
 3.1.1 The ad hoc Tribunals 
 The different international and internationalized criminal courts and tribunals 
have approached the issue of witness anonymity in a variety of ways. It was first raised at 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the Trial Chamber’s 
ruling on the Prosecution’s Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and 
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Witnesses in the Prosecutor v. Tadić. 65 With regard to this issue, the Trial Chamber 
determined that witness anonymity does not necessarily violate the accused’s right to 
“examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him”.66 According to the Chamber, 
the right remains intact so long as the accused is given “ample opportunity” to question 
the anonymous witness and the right is only “restrict[ed] to the extent that is 
necessary.”67 It reached this conclusion after weighing “the ability of the defendant to 
establish facts” against the interest in maintaining the anonymity of the witness. 68 The 
Chamber further found that balancing these competing interests “is inherent in the notion 
of ‘fair trial’” as set out in Article 20 of the Statute.69  
Article 20 asserts that trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia 
must be “fair and expeditious” and that they be conducted “with full respect for the rights 
of the accused and due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses.”70 The wording 
of Article 20 led the Trial Chamber to conclude that it had the discretion to limit the 
disclosure of the identity of the witnesses, but that its discretion could only be exercised 
in “exceptional circumstances.”71 In Tadić, the Trial Chamber overcame this limitation 
by declaring that an ongoing armed conflict of the sort taking place in the former 
Yugoslavia at the time constituted an exceptional circumstance “par excellence.”72 The 
Trial Chamber then announced five factors to be considered when determining whether to 
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protect the anonymity of a witness: (1) there must be real fear for the safety of the 
witness or her or his family; (2) the testimony of the particular witness must be important 
to the Prosecutor's case; (3) the Trial Chamber must be satisfied that there is no prima 
facie evidence that the witness is untrustworthy; (4) the ineffectiveness or non-existence 
of a witness protection program; and (5) any measures taken should be strictly necessary 
and a less restrictive should be applied if it can secure the necessary protection.73  
 The Trial Chamber recognized that because witness anonymity involves a 
restriction on the accused’s ability to properly examine the witness, certain safeguards 
also needed to be introduced to “redress any diminution of the right to a fair trial.”74  
Those safeguards are: (1) that the Judges must be able to observe the demeanor of the 
witness, in order to assess the reliability of the testimony; (2) the Judges must be aware of 
the identity of the witness, in order to test the reliability of the witness; (3) that the 
defence must be allowed ample opportunity to question the witness on issues unrelated to 
his or her identity or current whereabouts; and (4) the identity of the witness must be 
released when there are no longer reasons to fear for the security of the witness.75  It is 
interesting to note that all of the identified factors or safeguards identified by the Trial 
Chamber are directed towards the interests of the witnesses and none of them require any 
consideration of whether the accused will be prejudiced by the anonymous testimony.  
 Judge Ninian Stephen strongly dissented from the majority opinion set out in the 
Protective Measures Decision in Tadić. Judge Stephen concluded that the Statute did not 
permit the continued anonymity of a witness if doing so would have any real impact on 
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the rights of the accused.76 Judge Stephen also failed to find any support in the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence for permitting witnesses to remain anonymous from the 
defendant during trial.77 Judge Stephen cited a string of European Court of Human Rights 
cases in support of his position, starting with Kostovski v. The Netherlands, standing for 
the proposition that the use of anonymous statements as sufficient grounds on which to 
found a conviction “is irreconcilable” with the fair trial guarantees contained in the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 78  Based on the absence of any affirmative 
authorization in the Statute or the Rules permitting witnesses to testify anonymously, and 
the existing European Court of Human Rights case law, together with American, English 
and Australian case law, Judge Stephen found that “in this case to permit anonymity of 
witnesses whose identity is of significance to the defendant will not only adversely affect 
the appearance of justice being done, but is likely actually to interfere with the doing of 
justice.”79  
 The Kostovski case is an interesting one in the context of the Tadić Protective 
Measures Decision because both the majority and the dissent rely on it to some extent to 
justify their positions. Two of the safeguards identified by the majority as being needed 
to “redress any diminution of the right to a fair trial” are drawn directly from the 
Kostovski case and, when combined with the two other safeguards, were deemed 
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sufficient to permit witnesses to testify anonymously. 80  However, the majority 
distinguished the rest of the Kostovski decision on the grounds that it was too factually 
dissimilar from Tadić to be instructive. The majority’s decision to de-emphasize the 
impact of the Kostovski decision does not accord with Judge Stephen’s belief that 
Kostovski and its progeny are decisive when ruling on the issue o 
 The majority’s decision to disregard most of the Kostovski decision and its 
successors demonstrates that it intended to forge its own path in reaching its finding 
rather than relying on existing jurisprudence relating to witness anonymity. The Trial 
Chamber reasoned that the unique characteristics of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia’s Statute, in particular its affirmative obligation to protect 
witnesses and victims, requires that it be interpreted on its own terms and not through the 
decisions of other courts. 81  The Trial Chamber also indicated that because the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was operating during a 
continuing conflict, and without a police force or witness protection programme, the 
circumstances distinguished the context of the decision from any previous decision 
regarding Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or Article 
6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.82 
 The effect of the protective measures decision in Tadić was not limited to the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. In Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, 
Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda specifically took 
notice of the Protective Measures Decision in Tadić when reaching a decision as to the 
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appropriate protective measures to apply in Mr. Rutaganda’s case.83 The Chamber found 
that the prosecution only had to disclose the identity of certain witnesses to the defence 
so as to give the defence “sufficient time to allow the defense to prepare for trial” without 
elaborating as to what constituted sufficient time. 84  This position was reiterated in 
Prosecutor v. Musema.85  
 In Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Trial Chamber III of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda again relied on the Tadić Protective Measures Decision when it held 
an exceptional circumstance existed allowing the prosecution to withhold the witnesses’ 
identities from the defense until 35 days before that witness would be called to testify.86 
The Trial Chamber never identified the precise nature of the special circumstance 
justifying the late disclosure of the witnesses’ identities. Trial Chamber III also found in 
Bagosora that the accused’s right to a fair trial is a qualified one and that the Trial 
Chamber has the right to control the accused’s exercise of that right to the extent that the 
Trial Chamber is obligated to provide protection to victims and witnesses.87 In so doing, 
the Trial Chamber acknowledged that it was not giving effect to the literal words of Rule 
69(C), which requires the disclosure of the identities of the prosecution’s witnesses prior 
to trial, because doing so would “unnecessarily tax any real notion of witness protection 
without advancing the Accused’s right to effective cross-examination in any meaningful 
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way.”88 This demonstrates that although the Trial Chamber declared that its obligation to 
protect the victims and witnesses is of equal importance to the accused’s fair trial rights, 
in fact it viewed that obligation taken precedence over guaranteeing the accused’s right to 
a fair trial. 
    The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s reliance on the Tadić 
Protective Measures Decision to limit the disclosure of the identity of the witnesses can 
be partially explained by the fact that the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals contain 
identical provisions relating to the relationship between the fair trial rights of the accused 
and the Tribunal’s obligation to protect victims and witnesses. However, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s decisions on this issue fail to account for the fact that the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia justified its exercise of 
discretion in Tadić on the grounds that an exceptional circumstance existed in the form of 
the on-going military conflict. This omission is significant because although the 
Bagosora court found that there were exceptional circumstances permitting it to exercise 
its discretion, it never explicitly stated what those special circumstances were or 
explained what made them exceptional. Therefore, its reliance on the Tadić Protective 
Measures Decision is flawed, as one of the fundamental elements underpinning that 
decision is underdeveloped in the Bagosora opinion. It may well be that exceptional 
circumstances did exist, but without disclosing what they are it is difficult to accept that 
they are so exceptional as to allow an infringement on the fair trial rights of the accused. 
 The Bagosora court’s decision to preference the protection of witnesses over the 
fair trial rights of the accused is remarkable in light of the fact that decisions made by the 
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International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia after Tadić indicated that the 
original Tadić Decision was too permissive. Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Chamber I of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia reaffirmed the importance of 
imposing witness protective measures, but emphasized that the rights of the accused must 
be favored over the rights of the witness.89 The Blaškić Court also drew a distinction 
between the identity protections owed to a witness during the pre-trial period and the trial 
period.90 In reaching its decision the Blaškić court explicitly expressed its agreement with 
the holding in the Kostovski case and with Judge Stephen’s dissent in Tadić.91 Despite 
this, the Bagosora Court made no mention of the Blaškić decision and instad relied on the 
earlier Tadić decision. The failure of the Bagosora court to take notice of the Blaškić 
decision is particularly notable as Blaškić was decided more than five years before 
Bagosora. 
 The Bagosora Court’s reliance on the Tadić Protective Measures Decision would 
not be so concerning if Tadić and Blaškić were the only two decisions on this issue. 
However, there is a string of International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
cases which pre-date Bagosora and more closely follow the Blaskić decision than the 
Tadić decision. In Prosecutor v. Delalić, et al., the Trial Chamber of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia found that the accused “has a right to know 
the identities of the witnesses” that the Prosecution intends to call during trial.92 This 
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right is reinforced by the notion that adequate cross-examination can only result if the 
accused has had a sufficient amount of time in which to conduct a pre-trial 
investigation.93 The Delalić Court also identified the appropriate balance between the fair 
trial rights of the accused and the protection owed to the victims and witnesses. It 
clarified that “full respect” is to be given to the rights of the accused and that the court 
must act with “due regard” for the protection of victims and witnesses.94 The implication 
of this finding is that the rights of the accused are in a superior position to the protection 
of victims and witnesses. Just over a month later the Delalić Court again considered the 
issue of witness anonymity. In this second decision, the Trial Chamber reviewed the 
decisions in Tadić and Blaškić and specifically adopted the holding in Blaškić on the 
grounds that allowing a witness to testify anonymously constituted a violation of the 
accused’s right to participate in trial. 95  
 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia further developed 
its thinking about witness anonymity in Prosecutor v. Brđanin, et al. There, the Trial 
Chamber found that any balancing of the accused’s fair trial rights necessarily results in a 
less than perfect trial but that does not mean that the trial will not be fair.96  As a result, it 
concluded that a witness may only remain anonymous if it is established that the 
individual witness is “in fact” in danger or risk of danger.97 The Trial Chamber also 
found that the anonymity of a witness could be maintained only as long as required to 
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give the defense “adequate time” to prepare its case. 98  The Trial Chamber further 
expanded on this idea in a subsequent decision where it held that when reaching a 
decision as to the issue of witness anonymity the rights of the accused are to be 
considered first and the need to protect victims and witnesses should be considered 
second.99   
 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda revisited the decision in 
Bagosora in 2003. In the interim the case had been transferred to Trial Chamber I for 
consideration on its merits and following the transfer the defense challenged the original 
order entered by Trial Chamber III concerning witness anonymity. Trial Chamber I 
abandoned the rolling disclosure regime established by Trial Chamber III and ordered the 
prosecution to disclose the identities and unredacted statements of all of the remaining 
witnesses it intended to call at least 35 days before the next scheduled trial session.100  
Both ad hoc tribunals began to adhere more closely to the Blaskić decision after 
the revision to the Bagosora decision in 2003. The decisions issued by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia largely took notice of the fact that a witness 
could remain anonymous during the pre-trial phase of proceedings but that anonymity 
had to give way prior to trial.101 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda also 
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followed a similar rule whereby disclosure of the identities of protected witnesses had to 
take place thirty days before the start of trial and all at one time.102 Therefore, both ad 
hoc Tribunals ended up applying similar rules regarding anonymous witness testimony 
despite the initial disagreement about how to properly balance the fair trial rights of the 
accused with the need to provide protection to vulnerable witnesses. 
 3.1.2  The International Criminal Court 
 The International Criminal Court has examined the issue of anonymous witness 
testimony from the perspective of whether anonymous victims can participate in 
proceedings. This was, in part, necessary because of the more active role that victims 
play in proceedings at the International Criminal Court. In Prosecutor v. Lubanga, the 
Trial Chamber rejected the assertion of the prosecution and the defense that witnesses 
should not be permitted to testify anonymously.103 Instead, the court found that witnesses 
could testify anonymously only if that witness met certain criteria.104 The Trial Chamber 
also cautioned that anonymous victim participation could not “be allowed to undermine 
the fundamental guarantee of a fair trial” and that the extent and significance of the 
witness’s proposed testimony should be taken into account when determining whether he 
or she could participate anonymously.105 The court reserved for itself the responsibility of 
evaluating the potential prejudice anonymous victim participation could have on the 
parties.106 In Prosecutor v. Katanga, Trial Chamber II found that the accused does not 
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have an absolute right to know the identity of the witnesses giving testimony against him 
or her.107 Instead, it found that the Trial Chamber must strike a balance between the 
rights of the accused and the rights of the witness when the protection of the witness’s 
safety is at issue.108 However, any restriction on the accused’s right to know the identities 
of the witnesses against him must be strictly necessary and any infringement on the 
accused’s rights must be counter-balanced by other procedural measures. 109   Trial 
Chamber II also authorized disclosure of the identities of the witnesses on a rolling 
basis.110  
 A practice has developed at the International Criminal Court whereby a party may 
provide a preliminary list of witnesses identified only by pseudonyms. Trial Chamber IX 
approved of this practice in Prosecutor v. Ongwen, when it found that the defense need 
not be provided with the identity of vulnerable witnesses until leave has been requested to 
call those witnesses and the relevant participant has identified which witnesses, from a 
larger list, it actually intends to call.111 However, witnesses included on a preliminary 
witness list cannot be protected by pseudonyms when the party preparing that list has 
tacitly indicated that it already knows which of those witnesses it intends to call.112 That 
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is because preliminary witness lists would serve no useful purpose if the party issuing it 
could simply shield the identities of the witnesses it new it was going to call during trial.  
 The anonymous witness decisions in Lubanga and Katanga are reminiscent of the 
earlier decisions of the ad hoc tribunals without directly referencing them. The Katanga 
decision reintroduces rolling disclosure obligations rather than necessitating witness 
identity disclosure by a particular date. It also provides a reminder of the balancing tests 
common at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and 
particularly of the Tadić decision and its declaration that the rights of the accused and the 
rights of a witness are co-equal. Finally, and most importantly, it introduces the strictly 
necessary standard whereby the accused’s right to have information disclosed to him or 
her about the testifying witnesses can only be restricted to the extent that such limitations 
are strictly necessary.  
3.1.3 The Special Tribunal for Lebanon and the Extraordinary Chambers 
in the Courts of Cambodia 
 
 The Special Tribunal for Lebanon did not have to consider the issue of keeping 
the identities of witnesses from the accused as all of the accused are being tried in 
absentia. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon regularly issues orders protecting the 
identities of witnesses from the public and the media, but those orders are outside the 
purview of this article. The Special Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence do set 
out a procedure whereby the pre-trial judge can question an anonymous witness outside 
of the presence of the parties. 113  Although the Pre-Trial Judge is charged with 
interviewing the anonymous witness, the interview can take place during any point of 
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proceedings and is not confined to the pre-trial stage.114 After questioning the witness, 
the Pre-Trial Judge must provide the parties with a transcript of the interview and a 
declaration of his or her opinion about the veracity of the witness’s statement.115 The 
transcript is then included, along with all of the other evidence, in the file given to the 
Trial Chamber.116 The anonymous witness’s testimony may be introduced during trial so 
long as its probative value is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.117 The 
weight given by the Trial Chamber to anonymous evidence when making its decision is 
limited to the extent that a conviction cannot be solely based on the anonymous evidence, 
nor can it be considered decisive.118   
 The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia also has a system 
whereby the statements of anonymous witnesses can be recorded in the case file.119 One 
of the measures Co-Investigating Judges and Chambers may implement measures to 
protect the identity of a witness when the life or health of the witness, or of his or her 
family members, is in serious danger.120 To achieve that goal, the witness’s statement can 
be recorded without his or her name being recorded in the case file.121 Like the procedure 
used at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, a statement recorded using this procedure 
cannot be the only evidence supporting the conviction of the accused.122 
 3.1.4 Conclusion 
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 International and internationalized criminal courts and tribunals have found that 
the accused’s right to cross-examine the witnesses against them, as part of his or her right 
to be present, generally means that the witness’s identity cannot be withheld from the 
accused. Instead, courts and tribunals considering this issue have tended towards 
imposing temporal limits on the disclosure of the identity of witnesses. This is done in an 
effort to provide the witness with protection while still giving the accused adequate time 
to prepare his or her examination of the protected witness. More recently, some courts 
and tribunals have adopted a procedure whereby anonymous testimony can be recorded 
and used to inculpate the accused, but it cannot be the only evidence, or the decisive 
evidence, supporting a conviction. This procedure may help protect vulnerable witnesses 
from harm while also ensuring that the accused will not be convicted on the basis of 
anonymous testimony. Unfortunately, it also has the tendency to encourage courts and 
tribunals to rely on written witness statements that have not been subjected to cross-
examination. This poses a different risk to the accused’s right to participate and right to 
be present at trial. 
3.2 Replacing Live Testimony with Written Witness Statements 
 A second evidentiary issue affecting the accused’s right to be present a trial is the 
prosecution’s use of written witness statements during trial instead of live testimony. 
Written witness statements are out-of-court statements made by witnesses and offered 
into evidence in lieu of in court testimony. Written witness statements can be useful tools 
for expediting trials, but over-reliance on them “undermines the purposes of cross-
examination” and “creates doubts about the reliability of the statement.” 123  Written 
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witness statements include: affidavits, interview transcripts, transcripts from other court 
proceedings and summaries of witness statements. The introduction of written witness 
statements into evidence often takes one of two forms. The first allows the written 
statement to be admitted as a replacement for direct in-court testimony but the declarant 
must still appear in court and be subjected to cross-examination. The second form permits 
the written statement to entirely replace the witness’s live testimony and the witness is 
never subject to cross-examination.  
 The Nuremberg Tribunal held after the Second World War was the first 
international or internationalized criminal court or tribunal to allow the introduction of 
written witness statements into evidence. Although not specifically authorized by the 
Statute or the Rules, the International Military Tribunal allowed the introduction of 
affidavits in lieu of live testimony but required that the declarant be made available for 
cross-examination.124 The International Military Tribunal for the Far East, held in Tokyo 
from 1946-1948, also allowed the prosecution to introduce written witness evidence. Its 
Statute specifically permitted the admission of affidavit evidence and the Tribunal issued 
a ruling at the beginning of the trial indicating that evidence could be presented by 
affidavit. 125 The Tribunal decided to allow the admission into evidence of affidavits 
despite the fact that it was aware that doing so would strip the rule against leading 
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questions of “all its practical importance.”126 The use of affidavits in the post Second 
World War context was justified on the grounds that it would expedite trial proceedings 
and allow the introduction of evidence from witnesses that might not otherwise be able to 
testify in person.127 
 3.2.1 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
 The ad hoc Tribunals also embraced the introduction of written witness 
statements in an effort to expedite trials.128 The admission of written witness statements 
was not originally part of the rules of the ad hoc Tribunals, however the practice was 
introduced in 1998 through an amendment to the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The newly introduced rule, Rule 
94 ter, specifically authorized the parties to offer affidavits into evidence to corroborate 
the testimony of a witness that offered live in-court testimony.129 The rule also required 
that the affidavits be filed prior to the introduction of the live testimony to which the 
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affidavits relate.130 There was no mandatory right to cross-examine the affiants, although 
the party not offering the affidavit as evidence could object to its introduction and the 
Trial Chamber could order that the witness be made available for cross-examination.131 
 The Appeals Chamber of the ad hoc Tribunals was called on to interpret Rule 94 
ter in Prosecutor v. Korkić and Čerkez. Three separate issues about the interpretation of 
Rule 94 ter were raised on appeal. The first related to the Trial Chamber’s finding that 
the requirement that the affidavits be filed in advance of the testimony was nothing more 
than a “formal, procedural requirement” which, if interpreted literally, “would certainly 
lead to or may lead to a defeat to the interests of justice.”132 In the alternative, the Trial 
Chamber found that the rule must be given “useful effect” in accordance with a “principle 
of international law”. 133  The Appeals Chamber disagreed, finding that Rule 94 ter 
contains strict procedural protections and that if evidence is admitted “in contravention of 
these protections, the intent of the Rule becomes distorted.”134 Rather, to properly give 
effect to the rule, the Trial Chamber must balance protecting the rights of the accused 
against the need to ensure properly and expeditiously conducted trial proceedings.135 That 
balance can only be struck by strictly following the procedural requirements of Rule 94 
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ter and that those technical requirements are “an integral part of the Rule protecting the 
rights of the accused.”136   
 The second issue considered by the Appeals Chamber was whether an objection 
to the admission of an affidavit automatically led to the affidavit being excluded from 
evidence if the affiant was not produced for cross-examination. The Appeals Chamber 
found that it did not. Rather, the rule only granted the right to object to the party not 
offering the evidence with the Trial Chamber maintaining the discretion to order the 
affiant to appear for cross-examination.137 Third, the Appeals Chamber agreed with the 
Trial Chamber’s finding that the affidavit must address some fact in dispute and that the 
term “fact in dispute” must not be construed too narrowly.138  However, the Appeals 
Chamber found that the Trial Chamber interpreted the term “fact in dispute” too broadly 
and that there must be a clear link between the testimony and the affidavit testimony 
introduced to support it.139 
 Soon after the Appeals Chamber announced its decision in Korkić and Čerkez, the 
judges of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, sitting in plenary 
session, deleted Rule 94 ter from the rules and replaced it with Rule 92 bis.140 This 
change represented the culmination of an on-going process aimed at shortening the length 
of trials at the Tribunal. The President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia, Antonio Cassese, established a working group in December 1997 
tasked with investigating how trial could be conducted more expeditiously “without 
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jeopardizing respect for the rights of accused persons.”141 The findings of the working 
group led to the amendment in 1998 of numerous court rules particularly directed 
towards speeding up the pre-trial stage of proceedings.142 These changes did not resolve 
the length of trial concerns and the matter was taken up again in August 1999.143 At that 
time, the judges reiterated their commitment to reducing the length of trial and 
specifically reminded the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council that 
unlike the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo following World 
War II, the Yugoslavia Tribunal was primarily receiving evidence through live in-court 
testimony rather than affidavits.144  Although the Tribunal did not directly state that the 
use of live in-court testimony was slowing down proceedings, the implication was clear. 
 The judges were not alone in being concerned about the efficiency of the ad hoc 
Tribunals. In November 1998, the United Nations’ Advisory Committee on 
Administrative and Budgetary Questions called for a comprehensive review of the 
management and structure of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia. 145  In response, the General Assembly simultaneously adopted two 
resolutions requesting that the Secretary-General conduct a review of the Tribunal’s 
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efficient use of resources by each of the ad hoc Tribunals. 146 To comply with those 
resolutions, the Secretary-General set up an expert group to conduct the requested 
reviews.147 
 The expert group established to review the operations of the Tribunals issued its 
report and recommendations on November 11, 1999.148 It noted that “[m]ajor concerns 
have been voiced not only by United Nations officials, Member States and others, but 
also by the organs of the Tribunals with regard to the slowness of the proceedings”.149 
The expert group identified a number of reasons for the delays; including an inadequate 
number of courtrooms and judges, the necessity of translating large amounts of evidence 
and pre-trial and trial motion practice.150 Significantly, the expert group also identified a 
lack of judicial control over trial, including, but not limited to, a failure on the part of the 
judges to satisfactorily limit the manner in which evidence was being presented.151 This 
led to a recommendation suggesting that a rule might be added to the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence whereby the Prosecution could introduce written witness statement into 
evidence in lieu of direct testimony, and the accused would have the opportunity to cross-
examine the person making the statement if the accused so wished.152  
This all culminated in December 2000 with the introduction of Rule 92 bis and 
the deletion of Rule 94 from the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The purpose of this 
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new rule was to facilitate the admission of peripheral and background information 
through written submissions in order to expedite proceeding while simultaneously 
protecting the fair trial rights of the accused.153 The addition of Rule 92 bis, together with 
the deletion of Rule 90(A), which codified the primacy of oral testimony, was described 
by Judge Patricia Wald as part of “the emerging dominance of written testimony.”154 
Rule 92 bis allows the Trial Chamber to admit “in whole or in part, the evidence of a 
witness in the form of a written statement in lieu of oral testimony which goes to proof of 
a matter other than the acts and conduct of the accused as charged in the indictment.”155 
The primary effect of Rule 92 bis as compared to Rule 94 ter is that Rule 92 bis de-
emphasized the importance of the affidavit corroborating oral testimony, making 
corroboration just one of six factors to consider when deciding whether to accept the 
affidavit into evidence.156 Commentators at the time noted that the rule change appeared 
to have had a dramatic effect on the way in which the prosecution was seeking to present 
its cases.157 For example, in Prosecutor v. Plavšić and Krajišnik, the prosecution sought 
to present the written statements of approximately 170 witnesses in lieu of oral 
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testimony.158  
 It was generally thought that the introduction of Rule 92 bis would help shorten 
trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia by reducing 
“pointless and repetitive cross-examination”.159 However, a study conducted by Máximo 
Langer and Joseph Doherty of trials held between 26 April 1995 and 1 July 2006 
demonstrated just the opposite.160 Langer and Doherty found that rather than decreasing 
the length of trial, Rule 92 bis, together with other new rules adopted by the Tribunal, 
actually increased the length of trials.161 They attributed this to the fact that the measures 
introduced to shorten trial actually created new procedural steps and requirements that 
made trial longer.162 The study also revealed that written witness statements were being 
offered into evidence in addition to, rather than in lieu of, live in-court testimony.163 The 
study did find that there was a slight decrease in the number of live witnesses testifying 
during trial after Rule 92 bis was introduced.164 Despite that, this reform largely failed to 
achieve the goals underlying its purpose of reducing the length of trials at the Tribunal. 
This demonstrates the dangerous proposition of reducing the accused’s rights when 
lacking certainty that the proposed infringement will create some tangible benefit.  
 Both the language of Rule 92 bis and the 2001 Annual Report on the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia emphasize that Rule 92 bis is only meant to 
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admit written statements into evidence that relate to “peripheral or background evidence 
in order to expedite proceedings while protecting the rights of the accused under the 
Statute.”165 However, the first decision to interpret that rule indicated that the Tribunal 
intended to employ Rule 92 bis more broadly than the language of the rule or the 2001 
Annual Report might suggest. In Prosecutor v. Sikirica, et al., the Trial Chamber 
specified that when reaching a decision as to whether it should order a witness to appear 
for cross-examination following the introduction of his or her written statement, it must 
consider whether the written statement “goes to proof of a critical element of the 
Prosecution’s case against the accused.”166 By applying this approach, the Sikirica Trial 
Chamber admitted written evidence from three different witnesses directly relating to Mr. 
Sikirica’s intent to commit genocide, as well as the written testimony of one witness 
which did not directly implicate any of the accused but had a bearing on the case in a “a 
significant and direct way.”167   
The Trial Chamber did allow the defence to cross-examine all four of these 
witnesses but that fact misses the larger point. Both Rule 92 bis and the 2001 Annual 
Report clarify that only background and peripheral evidence should be admitted through 
written evidence. The Sikirica Trial Chamber ignored that aspect of the rule completely 
and allowed the introduction of written evidence relating directly to the crimes alleged. 
Simply because the Chamber allowed these witnesses to be cross-examined does not 
change the fact that the witnesses’ direct evidence was in written form. When a witness 
proposes to testify as to facts that are material to the charges brought against the accused, 
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he or she should be required to present that evidence orally. One of the fundamental 
purposes of live testimony is to allow the Trial Chamber to observe the demeanor of the 
witness while he or she is testifying. That cannot be accomplished if the witness can 
present some part of his or her testimony in writing. The Sikirica court ignored that 
purpose in its ruling. From the outset, Rule 92 bis was applied in a manner inconsistent 
with itself.  
Despite this inconsistency, Rule 92 bis continued to be used to allow the 
introduction of written witness testimony during trial that had a direct bearing on the guilt 
or innocence of the accused. That written witness statements were being used in this way 
was tacitly recognized in Prosecutor v Limaj. There, the Trial Chamber found that “when 
a written statement touches upon the very essence of the prosecution case against the 
accused, the witness should be available for cross-examination.”168 This pronouncement 
demonstrates that written witness statements were being introduced that related to critical 
elements of the Prosecution’s case, despite the fact that doing so clearly exceeded the 
scope and purpose of the rule. This approach to written witness testimony constitutes an 
infringement on the accused’s right to participate in trial and the right to be present.169 It 
enhanced the possibility that an accused would be convicted on the basis of evidence he 
or she did not have the opportunity to test and raised the likelihood of his or her 
conviction on an improper basis. 
 The Appeals Chamber of the ad hoc Tribunals extended this permissive approach 
to allowing the introduction of written witness statements during trial in a 2003 decision 
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in Prosecutor v. Milošević. There, the Appeals Chamber found that a written statement 
could be introduced at trial as evidence in chief against the accused so long as the 
witness: “(1) is present in court; (2) is available for cross-examination and any 
questioning by the judges; and (3) attests that the statement accurately reflects his or her 
declaration and what he or she would say if examined.”170 This decision reflected the 
Appeals Chamber’s belief that the presence of the witness in the courtroom, and his or 
her attestation to the veracity of the written statement, makes the witness’s statement both 
written and oral and takes it outside of the ambit of Rule 92 bis.171   
 The broader approach taken in the Milošević decision was met with approval. 
This was made clear when Rule 92 ter was adopted containing almost the identical 
language used in the Milošević decision.172 Two additional rules relating to this issue 
would also be added, Rule 92 quater and Rule 92 quinquies. Rule 92 quater permits the 
Trial Chamber to admit written statements relating to the acts and conduct charged in the 
indictment from unavailable witnesses, including the deceased, witnesses that cannot be 
found and witnesses that are either physical or mentally unfit to attend trial.173 Rule 92 
quinquies authorizes the Trial Chamber to consider the written statements of witnesses 
that have been interfered with in such a way as to prevent that witness from appearing in 
court to testify or, after appearing, that witness declines to give full and truthful 
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evidence.174 These evidentiary rules, taken together with the Tribunal’s interpretation of 
them, largely allow any sort of written evidence to be admissible at trial. This represents 
a complete departure from the original rules of the Tribunal, which indicated a clear 
preference for oral testimony. 175  Unfortunately, this change in how evidence was 
received by the tribunal did not represent an effort to find a better approach, but is the 
result of pressure being placed on the tribunal to prosecute the defendants more 
expeditiously. In so doing the accused’s right to participate in trial was limited. 
3.2.2  The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and Special Court 
for Sierra Leone 
 
 Both the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone have placed significantly less reliance on written witness statements than 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. With respect to the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, this divergence is largely the result of 
different approaches taken to how evidence was received during trial. Unlike the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda maintained the primacy of oral testimony during trial and only 
adopted Rule 92 bis and not Rules 92 ter, 92 quater and 92 quinquies.176  Further, Rule 
92 bis remained largely unused, with Prosecutor v. Karamera et al. being the only case in 
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which a significant number of Rule 92 bis statements were admitted. 177   The Trial 
Chamber’s decision to more liberally admit written witness statements in that case has 
been attributed to the fact that the prosecution had already presented oral testimony 
during trial corroborating the facts discussed in the written statements.178   
 The Special Court for Sierra Leone readily adopted its own versions of Rules 92 
bis, 92 ter and 92 quater, but did not demonstrate any urgency in applying them. The 
Special Court denied the only request to admit statements pursuant to Rule 92 ter, citing 
the fact that an agreement between the parties is a condition precedent to admitting 
evidence under the Rule.179 During Prosecutor v. Taylor, the Special Court did admit the 
transcripts of two deceased witnesses that testified in other Special Court trials prior to 
their deaths.180 The Special Court for Sierra Leone specifically found that the proposed 
evidence was both reliable and relevant. 181 The use of written testimony in this way 
would prove to be the exception, and not the rule, at the Special Court for Sierra Leone.  
 3.2.3  International Criminal Court 
 Like the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the 
International Criminal Court has changed its position over time to make it easier to admit 
written witness statements during trial. Article 69 of the Rome Statute expressly 
identifies a preference for live, in-person witness testimony, although that preference is 
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subject to Rule 68 of the International Criminal Court’s Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence.182 The original version of Rule 68 permitted the introduction of written witness 
statements during trial subject to the limitation that such statements will only be admitted 
if the party not introducing the written statement either had the opportunity to examine 
the witness when the statement was being recorded or the witness was present during trial 
and available to be cross-examined. 183 That changed in 2013 when the Assembly of 
States Parties broadened the circumstances under which written witness statements would 
be allowed into evidence by adopting a rule analogous to Rule 92 bis at the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The new Rule 68(2)(b) permits the 
introduction of prior recorded testimony that “goes to proof of a matter other than the acts 
or conduct of the accused” and does not necessitate giving the opposing party the 
opportunity to question the witness either when the statement was made or during trial.184 
Trial Chamber IX would later explain that the purpose of the rule is to recognize that 
some evidence, “in light of its content and significance to the case”, need not be tested 
orally during trial.185  
 The meaning of the term “acts or conduct of the accused” has been the subject of 
litigation at the International Criminal Court. In Prosecutor v Ongwen, the Trial Chamber 
found that the “acts or conduct of the accused” must be given its plain meaning, which 
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extends only to “the personal actions or omissions of the accused.”186 Left out of this 
narrow definition are the acts or omissions of others that may be attributed to the accused 
under one of the modes of liability described in Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute.187 In 
reaching its decision, Trial Chamber IX specifically recognized that its definition of “acts 
or conduct of the accused” accords with the approach taken by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia when determining the admissibility of Rule 92 bis 
witness statements.188 Trial Chamber IX then set out a comprehensive set of factors it 
would consider when determining whether a prior witness statement should be introduced 
under Rule 68(2)(b). Those factors are: whether the testimony relates to matters not 
materially in dispute; whether the interests of justice are better served by the introduction 
of the disputed testimony; whether the written statement possesses sufficient indicia of 
reliability; and whether the evidence is of such a nature that it is unnecessary to call the 
witness to testify.189 
The Trial Chamber’s characterization of the first of these factors is interesting 
because it does not necessarily comport with the language of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence. Rule 68(2)(b) permits the introduction of written evidence that “goes to 
matters of proof other than the acts or conduct of the accused.”190 When given its plain 
meaning, the language of the Rule forecloses the use of prior witness statements 
whenever they deal with the accused acts or conduct, regardless of the relationship those 
acts may have to the crimes charged. By contrast, the Trial Chamber broadened the 
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instances in which prior witness statements might be utilized during trial by introducing 
the materiality of the accused’s actions into its consideration. Whereas Rule 68(2)(b) 
discusses any acts or conduct of the accused, the Trial Chamber’s decision suggests that 
it will permit the use of prior witness statements about the accused’s acts or conduct 
except when the acts or conduct in question relate to the crimes charged. The Trial 
Chamber made it even more likely that prior witness statements relating to the accused’s 
actions would be admitted during trial when it interpreted “materially” to mean matters 
that are “soundly and conceivably disputed between the parties and are crucial, or of at 
least sufficient significance for the Chamber’s eventual determination of the charges 
against the accused in its judgment.”191 This approach reaches well beyond the plain 
meaning of the language of the rule and makes it significantly easier for evidence to be 
introduced during trial that is not subject to cross-examination. By expanding the types of 
evidence that can be admitted without being subject to cross-examination, the new rule 
represents a significant threat to the accused’s right to be present.  
Other issues have also arisen with how these new rules are to be used. In 
Prosecutor v Ruto et al., the International Criminal Court confronted an issue similar to 
that addressed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s Rule 
92 quinquies. Several witnesses in the Ruto case recanted their testimony, allegedly under 
pressure from individuals acting to benefit the defendants. The prosecution sought to 
offer into evidence those statements made by the relevant witnesses prior to their 
recantations. However, the court rule allowing the introduction of prior recorded 
statements, Rule 68, was amended during the pendency of the trial, and the provisions on 
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which the prosecution sought to rely were introduced as part of the amended rule.192 As a 
result, the court was required to determine if the retroactive application of the rule would 
detrimentally impact the accused.193   
 On August 19, 2015, Trial Chamber V(A) accepted into evidence the prior written 
statements of four witnesses that it found had been improperly interfered with, leading 
those witnesses to recant their earlier testimony or give false testimony during trial.194  
The Trial Chamber concluded that Rule 68 is not inherently detrimental to the accused 
because any party to the proceedings can employ it and that the prosecution’s use of the 
rule to request the introduction of evidence adverse to the defendant does not 
automatically make it detrimental to the accused.195 The Trial Chamber also found that 
admitting the prior recorded statements was in the interests of justice as it promoted the 
accused’s right to be tried without undue delay and fulfilled the Article 69(3) provision 
that the Trial Chamber take into account all evidence it considers necessary for 
determining the truth. 196  Therefore, Rule 68, as amended by the Assembly of State 
Parties after the trial commenced, could be applied retroactively.197 The Trial Chamber 
also found that the prior recorded statements could be introduced into evidence even 
though they addressed the acts and conduct of the accused, on the basis that the defense 
had the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses during trial.198  
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 The Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber’s decision to admit the prior 
recorded statements on the grounds that the Trial Chamber inaccurately evaluated the 
detriment to the accused when admitting the prior recorded statements and in finding that 
the rule was not being applied retroactively.199  The Appeals Chamber found that the 
Trial Chamber limited its interpretation of “detriment” to a consideration of whether the 
accused’s rights would be prejudiced. 200  The Appeals Chamber determined that 
“detriment” needs to be interpreted more broadly, and can be found if the accused’s 
overall position in the proceedings is negatively disadvantaged.201  It also found that Mr. 
Ruto and Mr. Sang were negatively disadvantaged by the admission of the prior recorded 
statements as they could only have been admitted under the amended rule, that the 
amendments to the rule expanded the exceptions to the principle of orality and it also 
restricted the accused’s right to cross-examination beyond that which was in effect at 
when trial commenced.202  Therefore, the retroactive application of the rule was to the 
defendants’ detriment as it negatively impacted their ability to participate in trial.203   
 Although the Appeals Chamber ultimately decided that the prior recorded 
statements could not be admitted in the Ruto et al. case, the disagreement between the 
parties that gave rise to the decision serves to emphasize the International Criminal 
Court’s growing move away from the principle of orality. The Appeals Chamber’s 
decision highlighted the fact that Rule 68 was amended in an effort to expedite the 
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court’s proceedings and streamlining the presentation of evidence by increasing the 
number of instances in which prior recorded testimony could be introduced at trial.204 
This reinforces the conclusion that the International Criminal Court chose to follow the 
lead of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. It opted to restrict 
the presentation of oral testimony at trial in an effort to expedite proceedings at the 
expense of the accused’s right to be present at trial as reflected through his or her right to 
participate.  
 3.2.4 The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
 Initially, it was an open question whether the parties could submit written 
statements in lieu of testimony during trial at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts 
of Cambodia. Rule 92 of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia’s 
Internal Rules is quite broad in that it permits the parties to “make written submissions” 
to the Trial Chamber at any time before closing arguments.205 When this rule is read 
together with Rule 87, which states that all evidence is admissible unless specifically 
excluded by the Internal Rules, it leads to the conclusion that the parties may present 
written statements in place of live oral testimony.206 In contrast, Rule 84 provides the 
accused with the “absolute right to summon witnesses against him or her”, suggesting 
that the accused must have the opportunity to examine all the witnesses if he or she 
wishes, even if their direct testimony is introduced in writing.207 This interpretation is 
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strengthened in light of the rights of the accused enshrined in Article 13 of the 
“Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia 
Concerning Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period 
of Democratic Kampuchea”, which in relevant part asserts that the accused has the right 
to “examine or have examined the witnesses against him or her.”208 
This matter came to a head in Prosecutor v Chea et al., when the prosecution 
attempted to introduce 1415 written witnesses statements into evidence. The Trial 
Chamber relied on the existing jurisprudence at the ad hoc Tribunals when deciding that 
under some circumstances such statements could be introduced.209 In particular, it found 
that written statements that go to proof of “the acts and conduct of the accused as charged 
in the indictment” were not admissible unless the accused had been afforded the 
opportunity to examine the declarant of the statement.210 Conversely, written statements 
that do not relate to the culpability of the accused are admissible, however a 
determination must be made as to the probative value afforded to such statements.211 This 
approach conforms to a strict interpretation of the rule originally established by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and minimizes the harm done 
to the accused’s right to be present. It also offers a possible template for other 
international and internationalized criminal courts and tribunals to follow as it 
demonstrates that there can be room for written witness testimony without overly 
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burdening the accused’s right to be present at trial. 
3.2.5 The Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
 The Special Tribunal for Lebanon has rules governing the admission of witness 
statements that are similar to those of the other courts and tribunals. Rule 155 of the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence permits the introduction 
of written statements in lieu of oral testimony, which go to “proof of a matter other than 
the acts and conduct of the accused as charged in the indictment.”212  In addition to the 
rules, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon also issued Practice Directions that function as 
guidelines designed to ensure the proper implementation of certain rules, including Rule 
155.213  The Practice Directions for Rule 155 set out how witness statements should be 
taken and what information they should include to later be considered admissible by a 
trial chamber.214 In Prosecutor v. Ayyash, et al., the parties agreed that certain statements 
that did not comply with the Practice Directions could be admitted into evidence but 
disagreed about the extent to which the statements could deviate from the Practice 
Directions. 215 The Trial Chamber found that although Practice Directions are legally 
binding documents, they can be departed from “where the interests of justice so 
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require.”216 The Chamber went on to find that minor breaches of the Practice Directions 
should not preclude the admissibility of witness statements but that there are certain 
elements of the Practice Directions that are “so fundamental to establishing the indicia of 
reliability that it is difficult to envisage overlooking non-compliance.”217 In the latter 
circumstance, the Trial Chamber must take into account five principles when determining 
whether a non-complaint witness statement is admissible.218  Those factors are: (1) that 
the purpose of the inquiry is to determine the reliability of the witness statement; (2) that 
it will only depart from the Practice Direction for compelling reasons; that each statement 
be considered individually and on a case-by-case basis; (4) some breaches will be so 
consequential so as to make it impossible to overlook them; and (5) minor breaches may 
be overlooked if there is a sufficient indicia of reliability.219   
 The Special Tribunal for Lebanon later rendered multiple judgments regarding the 
admissibility of witness statements in lieu of oral testimony. In a 20 December 2013 
decision, the Trial Chamber determined that 23 witness statements containing either 
minor breaches or consequential breaches had sufficient indicia of reliability to permit 
their introduction into evidence without the need to cross-examine the declarant. 220 
Conversely, the Trial Chamber also found that 10 statements lacked sufficient reliability 
and could only be admitted if the declarant was made available for cross-examination.221 
On January 30, 2014, the Trial Chamber admitted the statements of 20 additional 
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witnesses and required a further 16 witnesses to appear for cross-examination before their 
statements could be admitted.222 Between December 11, 2014 and June 30, 2015, an 
additional 32 witness statements were admitted without the need for cross-examination 
while the Trial Chamber only ordered the cross-examination of an additional nine 
witnesses.223 Therefore, despite finding that the admission of witness statements without 
cross-examination should be the exception and not the rule, the Trial Chamber admitted 
75 witness statements without cross-examination and only required the cross-examination 
of 35 witnesses.224 This indicates that the exception was allowed to subsume the rule. 
 3.2.6  Conclusion 
 Rule 92 bis of the ad hoc Tribunals, and its corollary rules at the International 
Criminal Court, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
accurately encompass the current state of international criminal law as it pertains to the 
admission of witness statements in lieu of testimony. It is important to note that all of 
                                                        
222 Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Case No. STL-11-01/PT/TC, Second Decision on the 
Prosecution Motion for Admission of Witness Statements under Rule 155, p. 19 (Jan. 30, 
2014).  
223 Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Case No. STL-11-01/PT/TC, Decision on the Prosecution 
Motion for Admission under Rule 155 of Witness Statements in Lieu of Oral Testimony 
Relating to Rafik Hariri’s Movements and Political Events, p. 7 (Dec. 11, 2014); 
Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Case No. STL-11-01/PT/TC, Decision on the Prosecution 
Motion for Admission under Rule 155 of Witness Statements in Lieu of Oral Testimony 
Relating to ‘Red Network’ Mobile Telephone Subscriptions, p. 7 (Jan. 19, 2015); 
Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Case No. STL-11-01/PT/TC, Decision on Prosecution 
Motion to Admit the Statements of Witnesses PRH082, PRH041 and PRH459 and to 
Amend the Rule 91 Exhibit List, p. 5 (Feb. 27, 2015); Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Case 
No. STL-11-01/PT/TC, Decision on Prosecution Motion to Admit the Statements of 
Witnesses PRH402 and PRH636, p. 9 (Mar. 27, 2015); Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Case 
No. STL-11-01/PT/TC, Decision on Prosecution Motion to Admit the Statements of 
Witnesses PRH007, PRH115, PRH396 AND PRH661, p. 7 (May 14, 2015); Prosecutor 
v. Ayyash et al., Case No. STL-11-01/PT/TC, Second Decision on Prosecution Motion to 
Admit Under Rule 155 the Statements of 13 Witnesses in Relation to Telephone 
Distribution and Subscription, p. 12 (Jun 30, 2015). 
224 Ayyash Second Decision, supra note 223, at ¶ 5. 
 57 
these rules are designed to only allow the introduction of written witness statements 
about peripheral or background information without the need for cross-examination. 
They are not meant to involve proof of the elements contained in the indictment or 
confirmation of charges. Unfortunately, both Rule 92 bis at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and Rule 68(2)(b) at the International Criminal Court 
have been interpreted in such a way as to allow the introduction of written witness 
statements that my contain information relating to the guilt or innocence of the accused 
while also depriving the accused the ability to question the declarant. This practice 
directly threatens the accused’s right to be present as it countenances the introduction of 
voluminous amounts of evidence that remains unchallenged by the accused. Under these 
circumstances, the prosecution is allowed to submit its case without any meaningful 
participation by the accused. 
 Trial Chambers considering whether to admit written witness statements are 
presented with two challenges. First, they must decide if the written statements are 
sufficiently reliable to be admitted into evidence. Second, they also must decide if the 
statements relate to peripheral evidence or direct evidence. Properly identifying these 
distinctions can be difficult, but it is also a vital inquiry. If the trial court allows the 
introduction of written evidence that is unreliable, or that addresses the elements of the 
crimes charged, the accused has functionally been denied his or her right to cross-
examine the witnesses against him or her as to those issues. That denial of the right to 
cross-examine also constitutes a denial of the accused’s right to be present at trial, even if 
the accused is present in the courtroom.  
3.3 Admission of Hearsay Evidence 
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 Hearsay evidence is generally admissible in international and internationalized 
criminal courts and tribunals. The prohibition on hearsay evidence is largely a creation of 
the adversarial legal tradition designed to protect against lay jurors being misled by 
statements made by a declarant other than the one testifying at trial. 225  Because 
professional judges, and not lay jurors, perform the fact-finding function at international 
criminal institutions, it is thought that the danger of the court giving undue weight to 
misleading hearsay evidence when reaching its verdict is significantly reduced. 226 
However, the admission of hearsay evidence does have an impact on the right to 
participate, and consequently the right to be present, because the defense is necessarily 
unable to cross-examine a declarant that is not present in the courtroom.227 
 Hearsay evidence had been a feature of international criminal law since the post-
Second World War tribunals. In his dissenting opinion to the Tokyo Judgment, Judge 
Radhabinod Pal noted that “[w]e admitted much evidence which normally would have 
been discarded as hearsay evidence” and “the major part of the evidence given” during 
trial “consists of hearsay.”228 This clearly troubled Judge Pal when he warned “[m]uch 
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caution will be needed in weighing this evidence.”229 Judge Pal’s concern about how 
much weight to give hearsay evidence proved prescient, as that has been the dominant 
topic of discussion regarding hearsay evidence at the modern international courts and 
tribunals. As Judge Shahabuddeen noted about the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia’s Statute, hearsay evidence is admissible and the only question is “the 
weight the Tribunal will attach to the evidence.”230   
 3.3.1 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
In Prosecutor v Tadić, the defense challenged whether hearsay evidence could be 
introduced at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The Tadić 
Trial Chamber reviewed the Statute and the Rules and found that there was no rule 
explicitly precluding the admission of hearsay statements into evidence. 231 The Trial 
Chamber determined that the exclusion of hearsay evidence is unique to the adversarial 
system and that because the tribunal’s rules are an amalgamation of adversarial and 
inquisitorial rules, it is not required to follow a peculiarly adversarial rule.232 The Trial 
Chamber then considered what weight to give hearsay evidence and found that it must be 
relevant, probative and that an “indicia of reliability” exists showing that the out-of-court 
statement was “voluntary, truthful and trustworthy.”233 It also found that when a Trial 
Chamber is making a decision about the weight to give hearsay evidence it must consider 
both the content and the circumstances under which the statement was made.234 The 
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International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s Trial Chamber followed this 
holding in Prosecutor v. Blaškić, while also elaborating about the type of inquiries that 
must be made to determine the proper weight to give the evidence.235 In particular, the 
Blaškić Trial Chamber identified cross-examination and judicial questioning about the 
source of a hearsay statement and the manner in which the witness came to learn the 
hearsay statement as ways to determine the appropriate weight to be given to the 
statements.236 
 Following the Tadić and Blaškić decisions it was generally agreed that hearsay 
evidence was admissible at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia. This has resulted in hearsay being accepted in a number of different 
situations including the admission of both open and closed session testimony given in 
other cases and the admission of recorded statements made by deceased witnesses prior 
to their deaths.237 This practice continued after the introduction of Rule 92 bis. When 
deciding Prosecutor v Galić, the Trial Chamber explained that Rule 92 bis was 
introduced “to qualify the previous preference in the Rules for “live, in court” testimony 
and to permit evidence to be given in written form where the interests of justice allow 
provided that such evidence is probative and reliable.” 238 This move away from the 
principle of orality opened the door for the introduction of more hearsay testimony as 
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written statements made out of court could be more easily introduced into evidence. This 
trend is largely unchanged since the early days of the Tribunal.  
 3.3.2 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has also found hearsay evidence 
admissible during trial. In Prosecutor v. Akayesu, the Trial Chamber indicated in its 
judgment that hearsay evidence “is not inadmissible per se” and that it considered 
hearsay evidence with caution when reaching its verdict. 239  The Appeals Chamber 
affirmed that decision and cited the case law of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia with approval to the extent that it permits the introduction of 
hearsay evidence. 240  The Appeals Chamber did comment that although hearsay is 
admissible, “the weight and probative value” afforded to it will usually be less than that 
given to testimony under oath and subject to cross-examination.241 Relevant criteria to 
consider when determining the probative value of hearsay evidence include: the source of 
the information; the precise character of the information; and whether it is corroborated 
by other information. 242  The Supreme Court of Cambodia would later endorse this 
approach when admitting hearsay evidence in the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts 
of Cambodia.243 
 3.3.3 The International Criminal Court 
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 The International Criminal Court also permits the admission of hearsay evidence 
during trial. The Lubanga Trial Chamber determined that the statute’s drafters 
intentionally avoided proscribing the introduction of any types of evidence, including 
hearsay evidence, and left the Trial Chambers open to consider any type of evidence so 
long as it meets certain criteria.244 The evidence must be necessary to determining the 
truth (i.e. relevant), subject to decisions on relevancy and admissibility and “keeping in 
mind the dictates of fairness.” 245  When the admissibility of hearsay evidence is 
challenged it must be evaluated for: (1) relevance; (2) probative value; and (3) the 
probative value must be weighed against the prejudicial effect.246 This list of factors is 
not exhaustive and other tools should be considered by the Trial Chamber, including “the 
indicia of reliability”, but without imposing “artificial limits on its ability to consider any 
piece of evidence freely.247   
 The Lubanga Trial Chamber’s approach to evaluating hearsay evidence was 
explicitly adopted in the context of the Confirmation of Charges hearing by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber sitting in the Katanga, et al. case. 248 The Kenya Confirmation of Charges 
Decisions also followed the Lubanga Trial Chamber and found that when considering 
hearsay evidence it must first evaluate its relevance and probative value.249 Additionally, 
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the Confirmation of Charges decisions in both of the Kenya cases indicated that hearsay 
evidence, as indirect evidence, is admissible during the hearing but should be afforded 
lower probative weight than direct evidence and that charges should not be confirmed 
solely on the basis of one piece of indirect evidence.250  
3.3.4 The Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon 
 
 The Special Court for Sierra Leone also admitted hearsay evidence during trial.251 
Although the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence are silent as to whether 
hearsay should be allowed into evidence, Rule 89(c) was consistently interpreted in a 
manner that allowed the relevant Trial Chamber to consider it. Rule 89(c) is a brief rule, 
only stating that “[a] Chamber may admit any relevant evidence.” 252  The Appeals 
Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone clarified this rule by explaining that 
relevant evidence should be admissible during trial regardless of whether it is the product 
of hearsay. 253  It justified its decision on several considerations. First, the Appeals 
Chamber felt that Rule 89(c) prevents “the administration of justice” from being “brought 
into disrepute by artificial or technical rules”, particularly those designed for use during 
jury trials. 254  Next, it felt that, like many other international and internationalized 
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criminal courts and tribunals, when judges act as the fact-finder they can give the 
evidence the appropriate probative value weight regardless of its source.255 Finally, this 
approach avoids “sterile legal debate” giving the court more time to consider more 
“pragmatic” legal issues.256  
Much like its predecessors, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon also admits hearsay 
evidence. In the Trial Chamber’s view, whether evidence is hearsay affects the credibility 
of the evidence, and therefore the weight that should be afforded to it, but not its 
admissibility.257 The Trial Chamber set certain parameters for its decision regarding the 
credibility of the hearsay evidence. First, it explained that credibility decisions must not 
be made in isolation, but instead it should be determined by taking into account the 
totality of the evidence.258 However, when considering what weight to afford hearsay 
evidence, it is relevant to consider the source of the hearsay information. When hearsay 
evidence is taken from a written statement, meaning that both the original declarant and 
the person who recounted the earlier statement are both unavailable for cross-
examination, it will decrease its probative value. 259  This seems to be a reasonable 
limitation when considered in light of the accused’s right to be present. It is difficult to 
see how the accused’s presence can have meaning if he or she is in any real danger of 
being convicted on the basis of a hearsay statement contained in the transcript of a 
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written interview, and the accused is deprived of the possibility of questioning either 
declarant.   
 3.3.5 Conclusion 
 It is an uncontroversial position that hearsay evidence will be accepted into 
evidence during international criminal trials. All of the international and internationalized 
criminal courts and tribunals admit hearsay evidence on the basis that it can contribute to 
the goal of determining the truth about the situation being adjudicated. Although most 
international and internationalized criminal courts and tribunals recognize that admitting 
hearsay evidence can constitute an infringement on the accused’s rights to confrontation 
and participation, it has generally been decided that because the fact-finders are trained 
judges they will be able to afford hearsay evidence its proper weight.260 This does not 
entirely eliminate the threat to the accused’s right to be present at trial, but it does 
reinforce the idea that it is a qualified right that international and internationalized 
criminal courts and tribunals may abridge when trying to determine the objective truth. It 
also supports the notion that the rights of the accused must sometimes give way in favor 
of the proper administration of justice. 
4. Conclusion 
Several of the evidentiary practices implemented by the international and 
internationalized criminal courts and tribunals have had the real-world effect of limiting 
the accused’s right to be present at trial. That is because the right to be present only has 
meaning if the accused’s presence enables him or her to fully participate in trial. When 
the accused is prevented from challenging the evidence against him or her they are being 
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denied the ability to participate and therefore are effectively absent. 
   Denying the accused the ability to know the identity of his or her accuser acts as a 
significant limitation on the right to be present. Knowing who the witness is, and how 
they are involved in the case, is essential to preparing an effective cross-examination. 
However, international and internationalized criminal courts and tribunals also have a 
responsibility to protect vulnerable witnesses from violence or other impermissible 
pressures. This has caused many of them to introduce systems pursuant to which 
temporal limitations are placed on the disclosure of identifying witness information. This 
approach acts to balance the demands of disclosure against the need to protect vulnerable 
witnesses. It is an imperfect solution, as it still acts as a limitation on the right to be 
present, but so long as disclosure is made in an adequate amount of time to allow the 
accused to fully prepare his or her defense, it should be seen as a minor enough 
infringement that does not threaten the overall fairness of the trial.  
Some international criminal justice institutions have begun implementing 
procedures whereby anonymous witness testimony can be recorded in advance of trial 
and used to inculpate the accused. While it is permissible to introduce testimony in this 
way, it cannot be the only evidence, or the decisive evidence, supporting a conviction. 
This falls under the larger regime relating to written witness testimony. The rules at the 
various international and internationalized criminal courts and tribunals provide some 
safeguard against an accused being convicted on the basis of written testimony by 
limiting the subject of evidence introduced in the manner to matters relating to peripheral 
or background information. Unfortunately, in practice that protection has not always been 
observed and there are instances in which uncross-examined witness testimony relating to 
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the guilt of the accused has been admitted during trial. This constitutes a major threat to 
the accused’s right to be present as it effectively deprives the accused of the ability to 
challenge the evidence against him or her. While the trial court must make some value 
judgment about the written statement before it is admitted, particularly as to its reliability 
and the type of information it relates to, it is of vital importance that they reach the 
correct conclusion as the failure to do so can raise serious questions as to whether trial 
has been fair. 
  How the judiciary weighs the evidence is also an important consideration when it 
chooses to admit hearsay into evidence during trial. Hearsay is generally admissible 
during international criminal trials on the basis that the court in its role as fact-finder is 
capable of affording such evidence its proper weight. While this approach has a tendency 
to reduce the risk of the accused’s right to be present being violated, it does not eliminate 
it. It does, however, highlight the notion that the right to be present is a qualified right 
that can sometimes give way in favor of the proper administration of justice. In this case, 
courts are valuing the ability to gain truthful information, regardless of the source, over 
the infringement caused by admitting partially untested evidence. 
The right to be present at trial is a fundamental aspect of the accused’s right to a 
fair trial. A present accused can understand the charges against them and participate in 
preparing and conducting their own defense. The involvement of the accused is often the 
best check against unfair or suspect convictions. Limitations on the accused’s right to be 
present in the form of evidentiary rules that constrain his or her ability to examine the 
evidence can pose a serious threat to the right to be present. However, the right to be 
present is also a qualified right and must give way in certain situations. A balance must 
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be struck between respecting the accused’s right to be present and admitting truthful 
evidence that will assist the trial court in reach a proper determination about the guilt or 
innocence of the accused. That being said, basic principles of fairness must always be 
maintained or the accused’s right to be present will cease to have any practical meaning 
and will become nothing more than something to which courts pay lip service. At that 
point, trials will cease being fair and international criminal proceedings will become little 
more than show trials. 
 
